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T he public prosecutor occupies a difficult dual role in our criminal
justice system. While the prosecutor's foremost responsibility is to see
that justice is done, he or she is also a key participant in a criminal justice
system which is undeniably adversarial in nature. Prosecutorial miscon-
duct, which is the result of the tension between those roles, places our
appellate courts in a dilemma. The paradox is that although (ideally) no
prosecutorial misconduct should be tolerated, it must be tolerated, for our
Constitution guarantees a criminal defendant a fair trial-but not a
perfect one. Most recently the United States Supreme Court, in Darden v.
Wainwright,' stated that where the error is forensic in nature,2 appellate
courts should reverse a conviction when the prosecutor's misconduct "so
infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a
* B.S. Baldwin Wallace College (1952); J.D. Cleveland-Marshall College of Law (1956);
Ohio State Senator 1956-58; Special Counsel, Ohio Attorney General 1960-62; Judge,
Common Pleas Court, Cuyahoga County 1964-72; Associate Justice, Ohio Supreme Court
1972-78; Chief Justice, Ohio Supreme Court, 1978-86. The author extends his appreciation
to his law clerks, Jane P.Perry and Charles J. Smith, for their assistance.
1 106 S. Ct. 2464, reh'g denied, 107 S. Ct. 24 (1986).
2 Forensic misconduct is defined as "any activity by the prosecutor which tends to
divert the jury from making its determination of guilt or innocence by weighing the legally
admitted evidence in the manner prescribed by law." Note, The Nature and Consequences
of Forensic Misconduct in a Criminal Case, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 946, 949 (1954).
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denial of due process." 3 Therefore, except in the most egregious cases,
appellate courts are placed in the uncomfortable position of condemning
the prosecutor's behavior while affirming the conviction, thus fostering
what an appellate judge once called "a deplorably cynical attitude
towards the judiciary. '4
The issue of forensic misconduct by prosecutors has long troubled our
courts. Nearly one hundred years ago the California Supreme Court,
citing error in the prosecutor's conduct during a capital murder trial,
included this admonition in its opinion:
We have been called upon many times to caution, sometimes to
rebuke, prosecuting officers for the overzealous performance of
their duties. They seem to forget that it is their sworn duty to see
that the defendant has a fair and impartial trial, and that he be
not convicted except by competent and legitimate evidence. 5
This article will focus on one aspect of prosecutorial misconduct which
has been chronicled with alarming regularity in recent state court
decisions: improper prosecutorial remarks during argument to the jury in
criminal trials.6 While frustrating, I do not believe the continuing
problem of such misconduct is intractable. Appellate courts can deal
firmly and fairly with such improper remarks and impose sanctions other
than reversal where appropriate. The most effective remedy, however,
lies with prompt action by the trial participants, that is, the trial court,
defense counsel and the prosecutor. Ultimately, the instances of pros-
ecutorial abuse will be reduced only when informed and educated
prosecutors police themselves.
3 Darden v. Wainwright, 106 S. Ct. 2464, 2472, reh'g denied, 107 S. Ct. 24 (1986)(quot-
ing Donnelly v. DeChristofor, 416 U.S. 637 (1974).
In Darden, the prosecutor's closing argument in the capital murder trial included a
statement that the defendant "shouldn't be out of his cell unless he has a leash on him .... "
The prosecutor also remarked at one point that he wished he could see the defendant sitting
in the courtroom "with no face, blown away by a shotgun." 106 S. Ct. 2472 at n.12. The
Supreme Court strongly condemned these remarks yet found that they had not deprived the
defendant of a fair trial.
4 United States v. Antonelli Fireworks Co., 155 F.2d 631, 666 (2d Cir. 1946)(Frank, J.,
dissenting).
5 People v. Lee Chuck, 78 Cal. 317, 328-329, 20 P. 719, 733 (1889).
8 The problem of such improper prosecutorial argument is acute because of its effect on
the jury. In the landmark case of Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78 (1935), Mr. Justice
Sutherland, writing for the court, explained as follows:
It is fair to say that the average jury, in a greater or lesser degree, has
confidence that these obligations, which so plainly rest upon the prosecuting
attorney, will be faithfully observed. Consequently, improper suggestions, insin-
uations, and especially, assertions of personal knowledge are apt to carry much





I. STANDARDS OF PROPER CONDUCT IN TRIAL ARGUMENT
In addition to obvious constitutional limitations, professional stan-
dards and ethical canons specifically govern the proper scope of the
prosecutor's argument. The American Bar Association Standards for
Criminal Justice: The Prosecution Function, Standards 3-5.5 and 3-5.8,7
("ABA Prosecution Standards") address the limits of permissible argu-
ment. Further, prosecutors themselves are keenly aware of problems in
argument to the jury. In 1977, the National District Attorneys Associa-
tion ("NDAA") drafted its National Prosecution Standards. NDAA Stan-
dards 17.5 and 17.178 set forth the boundaries for acceptable argument,
v Section 3-5.5 of the American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice: The
Prosecution Function provides:
The prosecutor's opening statement should be confined to a brief statement of
the issues in the case and to remarks on evidence the prosecutor intends to offer
which the prosecutor believes in good faith will be available and admissible. It is
unprofessional conduct to allude to any evidence unless there is a good faith and
reasonable basis for believing that such evidence will be tendered and admitted in
evidence.
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-5.5 (1980)(Opening
Statement)[hereinafter STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE]. Standard 3-5.8 reads as follows:
(a) The prosecutor may argue all reasonable inferences from evidence in the
record. It is unprofessional conduct for the prosecutor intentionally to misstate the
evidence or mislead the jury as to the inferences it may draw.
(b) It is unprofessional conduct for the prosecutor to express his or her personal
belief or opinion as to the truth or falsity of any testimony or evidence or the guilt
of the defendant.
(c) The prosecutor should not use arguments calculated to inflame the passions
or prejudices of the jury.
(d) The prosecutor should refrain from argument which would divert the jury
from its duty to decide the case on the evidence, by injecting issues broader than
the guilt or innocence of the accused under the controlling law, or by making
predictions of the consequences of the jury's verdict.
(e) It is the responsibility of the court to ensure that final argument to the jury
is kept within proper, accepted bounds.
Id. at § 3-5.8 (Argument to the Jury).
s Standard 17.5 of the National District Attorneys Association's NATIONAL PROSECUTION
STANDARDS ("NDAA") provides:
A. The prosecutor should he afforded the opportunity to give an opening
statement for the purpose of explaining the issues before the court and the
procedures of the particular trial.
B. The prosecutor should not allude to any evidence unless there is a good faith
and reasonable basis for believing that such evidence will be tendered and
admitted into evidence at the trial.
NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS § 17.5 (National Dist. Attorneys Ass'n 1977)(Opening
Statement)[hereinafter NDAA STANDARDS].
NDAA Standard 17.17 on Closing Argument reads as follows:
A. Counsel's closing argument to the jury should be characterized by fairness,
accuracy, rationality, and a reliance upon the evidence.
B. Because the prosecution bears the burden of proof, the prosecution should
1987]
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with detailed commentary. Finally, the Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity9 provides guidance for trial conduct and imposes disciplinary sanc-
"tions for improper and unethical conduct.
In reviewing these standards and rules, it is instructive to illustrate
them by setting forth specific case examples showing when and how
prosecutors have run afoul of these provisions during argument to the
jury.
II. ARGUMENT MUST BE CONFINED TO THE EVIDENCE
In State v. Andreason,10 the Utah Supreme Court reversed and re-
manded the defendant's conviction for theft of electrical services after the
prosecutor made prejudicial and improper remarks in his closing argu-
ment. In his final appeal, the prosecutor characterized defendant's type of
conduct as "pervasive" and told the jury it should be concerned about
"how many who aren't innocent are turned loose."" The court stated that
these remarks were improper because "[w]hat others did or did not do was
not in evidence and was certainly not relevant to defendant's guilt or
innocence."12
The Florida Supreme Court found similar reversible error in State v.
Wheeler.' 3 In this case, the state's high court reversed the defendant's
narcotics trafficking and firearm possession convictions after the prose-
cutor told the jury in closing argument that defendant was selling drugs
which could eventually end up on school grounds and in the jurors' own
homes. 14 The state supreme court found such remarks highly prejudicial
and violative of "the 'golden rule' of prosecutorial argument, that the
prosecutor cannot argue to the jury that they may well be victims of the
defendant's behavior if they fail to convict him."' 5 The court observed
have the opportunity to open argument and to rebut the defense's closing
argument with the order of the closing statements being prosecution, defense, and
prosecution again.
C. Counsel should have the discretion to comment upon the substantive law
relevant to the case.
D. The prosecution should have the discretion to comment upon the defendant's
failure to call witnesses under its control and favorable to its cause, excluding the
defendant, when a name has been raised in opening statements or where defense
has introduced the name or existence of an individual, the prosecutor should have
the discretion to comment upon the defense's failure to call that witness.
Id. at § 17.17 (Closing Arguments).
9 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONsIBILITY (1983).
1o 718 P.2d 400 (Utah 1986).
" Id. at 402.
12 Id.
" 468 So.2d 978 (Fla. 1985).





that there was no evidence at trial or in the record that defendant ever
sold drugs which ended up in school yards or jurors' homes.
These cases are examples of prosecutorial remarks concerning matters
not in evidence. ABA Prosecution Standard 3-5.8(a) states that it is
unprofessional for a prosecutor intentionally to misstate evidence or
mislead the jury as to the inference it may draw. 16 The commentary
explains that closing argument must be confined to record evidence and
inferences that can reasonably and fairly be drawn from that evidence.
17
NDAA Standard 17.17A also states that counsel's closing argument
should rest on the evidence.' 8 Disciplinary Rule 7-106(C)(1) prohibits
comment on or allusion to any matter which will not be supported by
admissible evidence. 19 Thus, prosecutors should carefully review their
planned remarks to be certain their closing arguments are confined to
"all reasonable inferences from evidence in the record." 20
III. EXPRESSIONS OF PERSONAL BELIEF OR OPINION ARE IMPROPER
The prosecutor's personal opinions are not properly a part of closing
argument. The Ohio Supreme Court has recently reversed a criminal
conviction in a case where the prosecutor repeatedly injected his own
views into summation. In State v. Smith,2 ' the prosecutor characterized
defense evidence as, inter alia, "lies," "garbage," "a well rehearsed lie"
and implied that defense counsel had conceived lies to be presented to the
court. 22 The state supreme court held that such remarks prejudicially
affected the defendant's right to a fair trial. 23
ABA Prosecution Standard 3-5.8(b), the commentary to NDAA Stan-
dard 17.17 and DR 7-106(C)(4) all forbid such statements of personal
belief or knowledge. It is thus wise for prosecutors to eliminate the first
person singular from their closing arguments as well as to refrain from
giving their personal opinions as to the credibility of witnesses or the
defendant's case. As the commentary to the ABA Prosecution Standard
3-5.8(b) states, "[t]his kind of argument is easily avoided by insisting that
lawyers restrict themselves to statements such as 'The evidence
shows . . .' or something similar."24
16 STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 7, at § 3-5.8(a).
17 STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-5.8(a) Commentary
(1980).
18 NDAA STANDARDS, supra note 8, at § 17.17A.
19 MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-106(c)(1)(1983).
20 STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, supra note 7, at § 3-5.8(a).
21 14 Ohio St.3d 13, 470 N.E.2d 883 (1984).
22 Id. at 14, 470 N.E.2d at 885.
23 Id. at 13, 470 N.E.2d at 883.
24 STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION § 3-5.8(b) Commentary
(1980).
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IV. REMARKS SHOULD NOT BE CALCULATED TO INFLAME THE PASSIONS OR
PREJUDICES OF THE JURY
The prosecutor's closing argument is often emotional. Certainly, im-
passioned argument on both sides of the aisle is heartfelt, effective and a
hallmark of our criminal trials. Unfortunately, the boundary between
impassioned argument and improper argument which inflames the
passions or prejudices of the jury is sometimes crossed by prosecutors in
summation.
One unusual case, Hawthorne v. United States,25 involved a murder
trial. Most of the closing argument by the prosecutor was delivered in the
first person voice of the deceased victim. The prosecutor told the jury that
"I on behalf of Mr. Alameda [the victim] have an opportunity to speak to
you." 26 The prosecutor, evidencing a power to communicate with those in
the hereafter, even described to the jury how the victim felt about his
murderers after he died.27 This argument had creative show quality and
was undoubtedly impressive, but it was also a basis of reversal of the
defendant's conviction. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals found
the prosecutor's remarks to be inflammatory and pervasive, resulting in
substantial prejudice to the defendant. 28
In State v. Couture,29 the state's opening summation in a murder trial
was found to be highly inflammatory. The prosecutor referred to the
co-defendants as, inter alia "murderous fiends," "rats" and "inhumane,
unfeeling and reprehensible creatures. '30 The Connecticut Supreme
Court, calling the remarks "egregious," rejected the state's harmless
error contention and reversed the defendant's conviction. 31 The court's
opinion stated as follows: "The prosecutor cannot pollute the waters and
then claim that we should ignore his actions because the fish are not
worth saving .... [A] failure on our part to reverse.., would suggest that
in a strong case the defendant is not entitled to a fair trial and therefore
anything goes."3 2
Name-calling as in Couture and invitations to the jury members to put
themselves in the victim's place are improper devices for use in closing
argument. Such remarks run afoul of ABA Prosecution Standard 3-5.8(c)
and NDAA Standard 17.17A. The commentary to NDAA Standard 17.17,
25 Hawthorne v. United States, 476 A.2d 164 (D.C. App. 1984).
26 Id. at 170.
27 Id. at 171 n. 17.
28 Id. at 171.
29 State v. Couture, 194 Conn. 530, 482 A.2d 300 (1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1192
(1985).
30 Id. at 561, 482 A.2d at 317.





directed to inflammatory remarks, is particularly appropriate to include
here:33
Melodramatic and lurid rhetoric 'is especially likely to stick in
the minds of the jury and influence its deliberation.' 34 The
prosecutor's role is one of impartiality; his vigor must be directed
solely toward the attainment of justice. Moreover, remaining
within the boundaries of fair argument need not minimize the
prosecutor's effectiveness.
V. THE PROSECUTOR SHOULD NOT RAISE ISSUES BROADER THAN THE GUILT OR
INNOCENCE OF THE ACCUSED
It is likewise improper for the state to inject extraneous issue into
closing argument, such as comments on the likelihood of appeal or parole,
for these references can bring erroneous considerations to the jurors'
decisions or diminish their sense of responsibility. Further, prosecutorial
closing arguments which stress "law and order" themes, urging jurors to
send a message to the community or telling jurors that the people of a
community desire or expect a conviction, have both been held improper.
Both ABA Standard 3-5.8(c) and NDAA Standard 17.1735 forbid such
remarks, yet recent cases evidence their continuing use.
In Lucas v. United States,36 the prosecutor told the jury that if the
defendant were found not guilty by reason of insanity, he would seek
release from a psychiatric facility within fifty days.37 The state's attorney
in People v. Holt38 claimed in closing argument that if defendant's theory
as to the degree of his offense were accepted, the jury would have
"guaranteed him a parole date."39
In Bell v. State,40 the prosecutor urged the jurors to remember that,
unlike the defendant in the murder trial, the victims "could not appeal
their death sentence to a higher court."41 Although not finding reversible
error, the appellate court strongly disapproved of the prosecutor's re-
3 NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS § 17.17 Commentary (National Dist. Attorneys
Ass'n 1979).
14 Hall v. United States, 419 F.2d 582, 587 (5th Cir. 1969).
" The commentary to NDAA Standard 17.17 states in part that "the prosecutor may not
relate the public sentiment regarding the case nor hypothesize concerning the effect of the
verdict on society or the accused."
" Lucas v. United States, 497 A.2d 1070(D.C. App. 1985), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 1523
(1986).
37 Id. at 1075.
" People v. Holt, 37 Cal. 3d 436, 690 P.2d 1207, 208 Cal. Rptr. 547 (1984).
39 Id. at 457 n. 14, 690 P.2d at 1219 n. 14, 208 Cal. Rptr. 559 n. 14.
40 Bell v. State, 707 S.W.2d 52 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986), withdrawn.
41 Id. at 75.
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marks.42 Likewise, in Bertolotti v. State,43 where the defendant was
convicted of capital murder, the prosecutor appealed to the jury to
consider the message its verdict in the penalty phase would send to the
community. The prosecutor urged the death sentence by stating in
closing argument that "[a]nything less in this case would only confirm
what we see running around on the bumper stickers of these cars, and
that is, that only the victim gets the death penalty."44 The Florida
Supreme Court did not consider these comments to be reversible error,
but did warn that "It]his [court] considers this sort of prosecutorial
misconduct, in the fact of repeated admonitions against such overreach-
ing, to be grounds for appropriate disciplinary proceedings. '45
VI. SUGGESTED REMEDIES
It is the rare case in which the prosecutor maliciously or deliberately
uses improper argument to secure a conviction. Yet the fact that such
excesses are unintentional does not mitigate the prejudicial effect of an
improper summation, nor did it prevent reversal in many of the cases
previously discussed. Reviewing courts have evidenced their appreciation
of the prosecutor's predicament. The ABA Prosecution Standards, the
NDAA Standards and the Code of Professional Responsibility do not
provide easy-to-follow "bright line" rules. Indeed, one commentator has
referred to the prosecutor's closing argument as "walking a tightrope." 46
The foregoing cases demonstrate, however, an increasing judicial
impatience with such blatantly offensive remarks. Courts and commen-
tators have proposed various measures to reduce the instance of improper
conduct in closing argument.
A. The Role of Appellate Courts
One sanction, suggested by several commentators, is more frequent
reversal of criminal convictions. 47 Nevertheless, appellate courts are
justifiably reluctant to overturn convictions, unless there has been
substantial prejudice to the defendant, because of an unwillingness to
impose on society the added expense of money and resources involved in
42 Id. at 76.
43 Bertolotti v. State, 476 So.2d 130 (Fla. 1985).
4" Id. at 133 n.3.
45 Id. at 133.
41 Vess, Walking a Tightrope: A Survey of Limitations on the Prosecutor's Closing
Argument, 64 J. CmIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 22, 22 (1973).
17 See, e.g., Alschuler, Courtroom Misconduct by Prosecutors and Trial Judges, 50 TEx.
L. REV. 629, 658-68 (1972); Note, Prosecutorial Misconduct: The Limitations Upon the
Prosecutor's Role As An Advocate, 14 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 1095, 1133-34 (1980); Singer,




a retrial.41 This is especially so where the evidence of guilt is over-
whelming.
Short of reversal, one court has stated that misconduct might be
deterred by "[a] reprimand in a published opinion that names the
prosecutor .... 49 It has also been suggested that appellate courts could
require the offending prosecutor to defend his or her trial conduct by
arguing the case on appeal. 50 Two courts have indicated that they might
refer prosecutors who make improper and unethical remarks for disci-
plinary proceedings under the Code of Professional Responsibility.51
B. The Roles of Trial Participants
1. Defense Counsel
There are a number of ways in which defense counsel can act to avert
instances of improper argument by a prosecutor. First, defense counsel
must ensure that his or her own argument is within permissible limits so
as not to invite an improper response. In this regard, defense counsel
must be familiar with and adhere to the American Bar Association
Standards for Criminal Justice: The Defense Function, Standards 4-7.4
and 4-7.852 governing opening argument and summation.
Secondly, defense counsel could offer a motion in limine prior to closing
argument if it is anticipated that the prosecutor is bent on making
improper remarks. This would serve to bring to both the prosecutor's and
the trial court's attention the boundaries of acceptable argument and
stress compliance with the standards. It could also avert an unwitting
prejudicial remark at a point in time when the state could still effectively
redraft its argument.
41 The difficulty of reversal is compounded by the fact that defense attorneys often do not
raise objections to improper remarks, for "tactical" reasons or otherwise. See Darden v.
Wainwright, 106 S. Ct. 2464, 2473 n.14, reh'g denied, 107 S. Ct. 24 (1986). In the absence
of plain error, many appellate courts will not consider an assignment of error predicated on
such misconduct if there has been no objection.
49 United States v. Modica, 663 F.2d 1173, 11,85 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 989
(1982).
o See Note, supra note 38, at 1133.
1 United States v. Modica, 663 F.2d at 1185 n. 9; Bertolotti v. State, 476 So. 2d at 133.
See also United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 506 n. 5 (1983). One former prosecutor and
now legal scholar has suggested that because neither opposing counsel nor the trial courts
can realistically be expected to initiate disciplinary action for unethical remarks in
argument by attorneys, enforcement of disciplinary sanctions should be initiated by the
appellate courts. This commentator has urged adoption of a disciplinary rule that any
allegations of professional misconduct (whether by prosecution or defense) coming to the
attention of appellate courts be automatically referred to the Disciplinary Counsel for
investigation. 6 J. PALMER, OHIO EVIDENcE REVIEW 890 (1986).
52 STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSICE, supra note 7, at §§ 4-7.4, 4-7.8.
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Defense counsel must also preserve error for appeal. This conclusion is
based on frequent review of cases in which the defense attorney, whether
for tactical reasons or otherwise, failed to object to improper prosecutorial
argument.53 It is this author's view that the risks of objection 54 are most
often outweighed by the benefits of preserving error for appeal. In the
absence of an objection, defense counsel faces the daunting task of
proving that improper prosecutorial remarks resulted in plain error,
requiring reversal.
2. The Trial Court
Both judges and commentators have urged trial courts to become more
active in supervising the conduct of counsel. The trial judge can interrupt
if he anticipates an improper line of argument and cut it off.55 If improper
remarks are made, the judge can order them stricken and, if a new trial
is not called for, a forceful curative or limiting instruction can be given.5 6
The trial court may caution the prosecutor on the spot or, if warranted,
reprimand him or her after the jury has been excused.57 In extreme or
continuing cases of flagrant misconduct in violation of court order, a
contempt citation could be issued or a mistrial declared.5 8 Counsel should
also be forewarned that arguments must be kept within bounds. 59
Finally, trial courts have been urged to curtail the fair reply doctrine. If
defense counsel makes an improper remark in argument, it has been
suggested that judges minimize the effect of the remark rather than
granting license to the prosecutor to retaliate in kind. 60
" See, e.g., Darden v. Wainwright 106 S. Ct. at 2473 n. 14, where the court noted that
defense counsel made a tactical decision not to object to the prosecutor's improper remarks
in hopes of encouraging the prosecutor to commit reversible error.
14 It has been suggested that the decision to object can sometimes be risky. Juries may
view objections, especially during closing argument, as rude or may regard objections as a
tactic to obscure the fact that the defense's case is weak. Objections may also call the jury's
attention to an improper remark it otherwise might have ignored. Thus, defense counsel
may, at times, be reluctant to object. See Note, supra note 38, at 1129-30.




59 See Note, supra note 38, at 1133.
60 Id. at 1132-33. This approach has also been endorsed by the United States Supreme
Court. In United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1 (1985), the defendant claimed that certain
improper prosecutorial remarks in closing argument, made in response to improper
comments by defense counsel, rose to the level of plain error, requiring reversal. Although
rejecting defendant's claim, the Court's majority opinion called this invited response
situation "an all too common occurrence in criminal trials ... " Id. at 11. As the Court





Those few prosecutors who repeatedly transgress the limits of proper
argument must be condemned by their peers. Ultimately, prosecutors
must make clear within their own ranks that abuse of the rules of
argument is unacceptable conduct. One way in which this can be
achieved is by continuing legal education, stressing the proper and
improper bounds of trial argument. Instruction can and should be given
to new prosecutors by seasoned attorneys. Moreover, education should
start while a potential prosecutor is still in law school. 61 The legal and
ethical limits of argument to the jury can be explored in clinical
programs, criminal law or procedure classes and in ethics studies.
Increased emphasis by law schools on trial ethics could be complemented
by inclusion on state bar examinations of pertinent ethical questions. The
ABA Prosecution Standards, NDAA Standards and the Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility should be required reading for each prosecutor as he
or she prepares the argument for trial.
It would be a disservice to the profession to give any credence to a
suggestion that most prosecutors are ruthless avenging angels who would
go to any length for a guilty verdict. It has been my experience, both as
a trial and appellate judge, that the overwhelming majority of prosecu-
tors are hardworking, deeply conscientious attorneys who desire to see
that justice is done, rather than to add another conviction to their record.
These prosecutors are undoubtedly dismayed when the reputation of
their profession is diminished by rebukes for improper or unethical
argument.
Such prosecutorial misconduct need not be an inevitable byproduct of
our criminal justice system. Through education, diligence and vigilance
at trial, the bench and bar must encourage respect for the standards
which guide responsible argument. Prosecutors must stress that proper
argument is the most effective and efficient means to the ends of justice
and a fair trial. Preventing the occurrence of improper argument is far
preferable to leaving it to the courts to reverse convictions or impose
sanctions after the damage has already been done.
to deal with the improper argument of the defense counsel promptly and thus blunt the need
for the prosecutor to respond." Id. at 13.
61 For example, one law professor states that he devotes the first ten minutes of each
criminal procedure class to discussion of an assigned ethics problem. Each student is
required to prepare a written memorandum concerning that problem. The need for such
ethics study is apparent. As the professor writes, "[m]ost of the ethical standards for young
law students come from television and movies, with the emphasis on winning at all costs.
Some of the attitudes expressed, . . .are quite distressing. Indeed, it takes some time to
change attitudes." 6 J. PALMER, supra note 42, at 908.
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